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Elites, Crises, and Regimes  
in Comparative Analysis [1998] 
Mattei Dogan & John Higley  
Abstract: »Eliten, Krisen und Regime in vergleichender Perspektive«. Most 
political regimes, whether authoritarian or democratic, are born in abrupt, brut-
al, and momentous crises. In this volume [Mattei Dogan, and John Higley: 
Elites, Crises and the Origins of Regimes], a group of prominent scholars ex-
plores how these seminal events affect elites and shape regimes. Combining 
theoretical and case study chapters, the authors draw from a wide range of his-
torical and contemporary examples to challenge mainstream developmental 
explanations of political change, which emphasize incremental changes and 
evaluations stretching over generations. Instead, the authors argue here, politi-
cal leaders and elites possess significant autonomy and latitude for maneuver, 
especially in times of crisis. And their choices are frequently decisive in the 
making of regimes and the forging of national political histories. Providing a 
sustained comparative analysis of elites, their circulation, and behavior across 
times and countries, this lucid volume will be invaluable for scholars and stu-
dents alike. 
Keywords: elite, elite theory, political change, crisis, regime, comparative 
analysis. 
 
Most political regimes, whether authoritarian or democratic, are born in abrupt, 
brutal, and momentous crises. Crises are the birth certificates of regimes: they 
mark their start; they can be found in the histories of nearly all countries; and 
they are commemorated by solemn ceremonies, days of remembrance, and 
many symbols. Crises involve sharp confrontations among political elites, and 
they often produce changes in elite composition and functioning that are mani-
fested by new or significantly altered regimes. Especially in moments of crisis, 
political leaders and elites possess significant autonomy and latitude for ma-
neuver. The choices they make at such moments are frequently decisive for the 
outcomes of crises and for the regimes that follow. Political elites are never 
wholly independent actors, but neither are they simply the puppets of larger 
class, economic, ethnic, or religious forces. 
Comparativists who study political regimes have customarily given priority 
to gradual processes of political development, comprising incremental changes 
and evolutions stretching over generations. This approach reflects the conver-
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gence of comparative politics with sociology and social history. Although 
beneficial in many respects, it has led comparativists to neglect momentous 
crises and to overemphasize the longue duree. The idea that regimes emerge in 
step with changing economic conditions, mass beliefs, political cultures, and 
other glacial processes of social maturation ignores the seminal importance of 
sudden and dramatic crises in the making of regimes and the forging of nation-
al political histories. 
We believe that it is time to return to the study of how crises affect political 
elites and regimes. Comparativists must bow before the enormous historical 
fact that most regimes are born in crises and elite confrontations; they originate 
in political impasses and elite power struggles fraught with the potential for 
great violence. It is necessary to re-establish this fact and to admit that theories 
that ignore the pivotal roles played by crises and elites in the birth of regimes 
have limited validity. 
A perusal of the circumstances in which most European regimes were born 
supports our belief. The British regime’s birth occurred in England’s great 
political crisis of 1688-89, the so-called Glorious Revolution, when Tory and 
Whig elites rid themselves of the detested James II and established a parlia-
mentary regime that has lasted to this day. Today’s regime in Sweden stems 
directly from the crisis of 1808-9, during which time the country, governed by 
the incompetent Gustav Adolf W, was in economic disarray and was threatened 
by Russian and French-Danish military invasions; as in England, leaders of 
opposing elite camps unseated the monarch and in five weeks negotiated a new 
and lasting parliamentary regime. In Amsterdam in the winter of 1813-14, the 
basic structure of today’s Dutch regime was created in a fusion of elites from 
previously disparate Dutch provinces amid the collapse of French military 
occupation; it was consolidated constitutionally in the subsequent political 
crisis of 1848. The latter year also witnessed the brief civil war in which the 
modern Swiss regime originated. In France, crises in 1789, 1799, 1814, 1830, 
1848, 1852, 1871, 1940, 1945, and 1958 spawned the revolutionary, dictatorial, 
monarchical, and several republican regimes that have made up the tumultuous 
French political record. Paralleling that record, Spain’s several authoritarian, 
monarchical, and republican regimes during the past two centuries were all 
born in crises, the most recent of which began with Francisco Franco’s death in 
1975. 
In Germany during the twentieth century, elites were reconfigured and new 
regimes were produced in four major crises: those of 1918-19, 1932-33, 1945, 
and 1989. Austria and Italy experienced two crisis-generated elite and regime 
changes during the first half of the century: in Austria, the downfall of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918 and the onset of an authoritarian regime 
under conditions of civil war in 1934; in Italy, the consolidation of the Musso-
lini fascist regime in a crisis during 1924-25 and that regime’s demise toward 
the end of World War II. Portugal’s long-lived and authoritarian Estado Novo 
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regime originated in a sharp economic and political crisis in 1926, and its suc-
cessor, today’s democratic regime, was created in the crisis of 1974-75, when a 
losing effort to retain African colonies culminated in coups and power strug-
gles among military and political elites. Similarly, in Greece in July 1974, a 
crisis that arose from the involvement of the colonels’ regime in a coup against 
the government of Cyprus and an ensuing Turkish invasion of Cyprus precipi-
tated an elite reconfiguration and the rebirth of a democratic regime in Athens. 
The list of crisis-induced elite and regime changes extends far beyond West-
ern and Southern Europe. In Russia, the Soviet regime was, of course, born in 
the great revolutionary crisis of 1917-18, and it collapsed in the space of a few 
months during another severe crisis in late 1991. The Soviet regime’s weaken-
ing during 1988-89 produced political crises throughout East Central Europe 
from which diverse postcommunist regimes emerged. The regime in Mexico 
today dates back to a political crisis that started with the assassination of presi-
dent-elect Alvaro Obregon in July 1928; Japan’s democratic regime was born 
in total military defeat and occupation at the end of 1945; Iran’s theocratic 
regime originated in a crisis during late 1978 and early 1979, when the shah 
was forced to abdicate and an Islamic republic was proclaimed; in South Afri-
ca, a crisis that climaxed between June and September 1992 provided the in-
centive for elites to create a substantially new and more inclusive democratic 
regime. 
This book [Mattei Dogan, and John Higley: Elites, Crises and the Origins of 
Regimes] explores these and other crises and their effects on elites and regimes. 
Its premise is that political regimes are deeply imprinted by the genetic crises 
and elite disruptions in which they are born. By studying crises and the elite 
changes they involve, much can be learned about the origins and trajectories of 
political regimes. This is not a simple undertaking, however, because the rela-
tion between elites, crises, and regimes is extraordinarily complex and variable. 
First, some political crises do not lead to significant elite and regime changes. 
The dramatic tempête in France in May 1968 produced widespread panic 
among elites and the political class, but it was nevertheless contained without 
important changes among French elites or the regime of the Fifth Republic. To 
take another example, the armed confrontation between the Russian govern-
ment’s executive and parliamentary branches in Moscow in October 1993 was 
clearly a crisis, but it produced few changes in elite makeup and regime func-
tioning. Second, some regimes originate in circumstances that fall short of 
profound crises. A number of the recent transitions from authoritarian to demo-
cratic regimes in Latin America (Peru in 1980, Uruguay in 1984, Brazil in 
1985, Chile in 1989) involved the negotiated transfer of government power 
from military to civilian elites in situations that were undoubtedly tense but 
hardly crises. Third, there can be significant elite changes, accompanied or 
unaccompanied by crises, without any clear regime change taking place. The 
gradual, electorally driven circulations of political elites in countries with sta-
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ble, politically representative regimes illustrate this pattern: witness Britain 
over the past two centuries and the succession of sixteen political dynasties, 
from the Adams to the Kennedy families, in the United States (Hess, 1966). 
Adding to the complexities, crises take many forms, and their intensities 
vary. As Alan Knight observes in chapter 2, there is no simple metric by which 
major crises can be distinguished from minor ones. Crises have a subjective 
component, so that what we as observers might regard as a major or a minor 
crisis may well be perceived as the opposite by actors who are embroiled in it; 
needless to say, it is actors’ perceptions that count. To give one example, com-
parativists observing Chile during 1973 might have had a hard time identifying 
a climactic crisis, but military and right-wing political leaders in July and Au-
gust that year felt the political and economic situation to be so dire that seizing 
power and liquidating Salvador Allende and his government was to them es-
sential. Nor is there any easy way to distinguish between simmering crises and 
sudden, crippling ones. As Michael Burton and John Higley note in chapter 3, 
Colombia has long been beset by guerrilla insurgencies, and many outside 
observers would say that Colombia has been in continual crisis throughout the 
past half century. But since the late 1950s and down through President Ernesto 
Samper’s recent entanglement with drug cartels, there has been no crisis explo-
sive or powerful enough to reconfigure elites or change the regime; conversely, 
as Burton and Higley show, the crisis in Colombia that did produce elite and 
regime change, during 1957-58, had little connection to ongoing guerrilla in-
surgencies. 
To make the puzzle still more complex, crises frequently involve more than 
elite confrontations. Mass protests, riots, strikes, uprisings, and assorted terror-
ist actions are often prominent features of crises, helping to shape their severity 
and paths. Many students of politics hold that mass discontents and pressures 
greatly limit elite autonomy, and never more so than during crises. Is it, there-
fore, wrong to focus primarily on what happens to elites in crisis situations? 
Should one instead concentrate on mass and “structural” forces? This is one of 
the issues most frequently raised in comparative politics and political sociolo-
gy. Although we cannot hope to resolve it, exploring the relation between 
elites, crises, and the origins of regimes yields much evidence about the politi-
cal intersections of elites and mass publics. 
Characteristics of Crises 
Because the term “crisis” is so casually and routinely used by politicians, 
commentators, and scholars to characterize all manner of events and situations, 
its meaning must be specified. By crisis we mean an abrupt and brutal chal-
lenge to the survival of a political regime. A crisis most often consists of a 
short chain of events that destroy or drastically weaken a regime’s equilibrium 
and effectiveness within a period of days or weeks. More rarely, a crisis is a 
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chain of individually small but cumulating events and power confrontations 
that unfold over several years. In either sense, crises should not be confused 
with the “historical crises” of center-periphery, church-state, land-industry, and 
owner-worker cleavages on which scholars associated with the school of politi-
cal development focused during the 1960s (e.g., Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; 
Binder, 1971). Although those lasting cleavages generated many specific pow-
er struggles, they were not crises as we think of them. 
Typically, crises involve a sudden flaring of belligerence by one or more of 
the elite groups that are jockeying for government power, a rapid escalation in 
the volume and intensity of political actions, and a clear change in the flow of 
power exertions among elites, as well as greatly increased elite insecurities. 
There is always much uncertainty about the outcomes of crises, and this uncer-
tainty is immediately and intensely felt by the supporters and opponents of an 
existing regime. Unlike palace intrigues aimed at changing the pecking order 
among individual actors, crises have far-reaching implications. They threaten 
to involve large segments of elites, and even of society, in violent actions more 
or less immediately. The Algerian crisis in France in May 1958 was a prototyp-
ical case: in a single week of high drama, General Charles de Gaulle reentered 
French political life and agreed to become premier, and in so doing he staved 
off impending civil war. 
It is necessary to distinguish crises not only from lasting cleavages and the 
changing power balances they gradually produce, but also from the assorted 
“affairs” and scandals that are often dubbed “crises” by commentators and 
journalists. The Dreyfus affair, which dominated French public life between 
1894 and 1906, or the Watergate and Iran-Contra scandals, which respectively 
preoccupied American politics during the early 1970s and mid-1980s, were not 
crises in our sense. The Dreyfus affair involved a heated moral, intellectual, 
and ultimately political debate about justice in France. The American scandals 
centered on breached codes of political behavior and standards of political 
rectitude among government officials and institutions. But these long-running 
disputes and revelations did not challenge the survival of the French and Amer-
ican political regimes, nor did they gravely weaken either regime’s equilibrium 
and effectiveness. 
Crises are potentially major turning points in politics. They go beyond the 
pushing and shoving, the tactical maneuvers and surprises, that capture head-
lines and are the stuff of everyday politics. Thus, a “government crisis” brought 
about by the loss of a parliamentary majority (as occurred more than fifty times 
in Italy between 1947 and 1997), by revelations of corrupt or immoral practices 
among the high and mighty (as happens recurrently in all countries), or even by 
the sudden demise of a powerful chief executive (such as the murder of Swe-
den’s prime minister Olaf Palme in 1986) are not in themselves crises, though 
they may sometimes be part of the backdrops to crises. 
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A Rough Inventory of Crises 
Specifying what we mean by political crises is a first step. However, the cir-
cumstances in which crises occur and the forms they take are so diverse that it 
is impossible to group them in a few tidy categories. It is nevertheless useful to 
assay several main kinds of crises and to explore their somewhat differing 
effects on elites and regimes. We propose the following rough, admittedly 
incomplete and overlapping, inventory. 
One kind of crisis often occurs when territories achieve national indepen-
dence. Especially after a violent secession struggle, national independence may 
involve the ascendancy, ex abrupto, of a new political elite. The new elite’s 
functioning, as well as the character and effectiveness of the regime it erects, 
are usually highly uncertain. There is much initial disorganization; new politi-
cal institutions are unfamiliar and untested; the new regime’s writ is not every-
where obeyed; different groups want to go in different directions or in the same 
direction at different speeds; there are old rivalries and scores to be settled; 
economic and other resources are in short supply. In 1948 there were 46 inde-
pendent national states recognized by the United Nations; today there are more 
than 190, many of them in old countries that have been resurrected. Not infre-
quently, their births or rebirths have occurred in crises from which deeply 
divided political elites and harsh authoritarian rule have stemmed. A good 
example is the chaotic struggles that attended the Belgian Congo’s abrupt inde-
pendence in June 1960 and their legacy of dictatorial rule by Joseph Mobuto 
over what came to be known as Zaire. 
A second, especially stark kind of crisis arises from defeat in warfare. The 
responsibility for defeat is almost always sheeted home to the political and 
military elites who presided over it. Where they are not annihilated, these 
elites, as well as the regime they operated, are destroyed politically. An ancient 
example was the overthrow of democracy in Athens following the disastrous 
defeat of the naval fleet sent to Sicily in 415 B.C. Some twentieth-century 
examples are the crises arising from military defeats of the German, Austro-
Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman imperial regimes at the end of World War I. 
Still deeper crises arose from the devastating defeats suffered by the Japanese 
and German Nazi regimes in World War II. Other instances of political crises 
stemming from defeats in warfare include France after the Franco-Prussian 
War in 1870-71, Portugal after failure in its African colonial wars in 1974, 
Greece indirectly by the Turks in Cyprus that same year, and Argentina in 1983 
after losing its war with Britain over the Falkland Islands. In each case, the 
existing regime either was destroyed or was so gravely weakened by defeat that 
there followed a period of great political uncertainty while surviving and 
emerging elites maneuvered for power. 
A third kind of crisis, and one that has received much study, is “revolution.” 
The quotation marks are necessary because there is no agreed definition of 
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revolution (for a typology of revolution, see Dobry, 1992). But whatever is 
precisely meant by the term, most historians and comparativists agree that 
revolutions have punctuated the modern political record. As the American 
historian Crane Brinton (1965) shows in his “anatomies” of the English, 
French, Russian, and (more dubiously, in our view) American revolutions, they 
constituted political crises of the highest order. Revolutionary crises involve 
interregnums in which all the expectations of normal political life cease to 
obtain, there is for the moment no clearly constituted regime, and political 
power is up for grabs. Recent scholarship on revolutions links them closely to 
defeats in warfare (the Russian and Chinese communist revolutions) or to fis-
cally enervating foreign adventures such as those France undertook during the 
1780s under Louis XVI (Skocpol, 1979, 1994). 
A fourth kind of crisis that might be distinguished involves the withdrawal 
of foreign support for ruling elites and the regimes they operate. A physical 
analogue would be the cracks that temperature changes create in the polar 
icecaps, so that great icebergs drift away and later melt. When foreign support 
is withdrawn (the “temperature” changes), elites dependent upon that support 
lose much of their capacity to rule, so that deep “cracks” at the elite and regime 
level quickly open. This approximates what happened in the countries of East 
Central Europe once the Soviet Union signaled, during 1988 and early 1989, 
that it would no longer use force to shore up communist elites and regimes in 
the region. In less than a year, eight countries recovered their national indepen-
dence and established new regimes, although most entrenched elites survived 
by shedding their communist mantles, adopting nationalist idioms, and reveling 
in testimonies about their country’s ancient lineage. However, the withdrawal 
of foreign support for a regime often occurs in the midst of, and due to, a crisis 
that already challenges the regime in question. It was in such circumstances 
that the United States withdrew its support for the Batista regime in Cuba in 
late 1958, for the shah’s regime in Iran during the last weeks of 1978, and for 
the Marcos regime in the Philippines at the start of 1986. The withdrawal of 
foreign support can thus be more like the proverbial straw that breaks the ca-
mel’s back, greatly fueling and perhaps even shaping the outcome of an already 
existing crisis. 
Political “implosions” may constitute a fifth kind of crisis. As happened to 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918, a radical decompression or a rapid and 
grave weakening of state apparatuses (the military, police, the central adminis-
tration) takes place. Ruling elites suddenly find themselves without support 
from any quarter, their capacities sclerotic, and their decisions and edicts large-
ly ignored. But violent struggles between ruling and challenging elites, accom-
panied by mass uprisings or military defeats by hostile foreign powers, are not 
central aspects of the situation. Implosions, in other words, are not the same as 
revolutionary crises. Although the societies in which implosions occur suffer 
great distress, most institutions and elites manage to survive, and there is no 
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chaotic interregnum when power is “in the streets.” There is, however, much 
disarray among political elites; regime leaders are discredited and forced to 
leave politics; their lieutenants hastily repackage themselves politically or 
move to elite positions outside politics; hodgepodges of leaders and cliques 
reconstitute the decompressed state, possibly with new territorial boundaries. 
Reflecting the trauma of implosion crises and the positional scrambles they 
entail, political elites become badly fragmented; elite relations and political 
game rules are in flux, and conflicts proliferate. All of this makes the character 
and direction of postimplosion regimes uncertain. 
Implosion crises result from a concatenation of accumulating economic mal-
functions, spreading corruption among elites, and greatly increased difficulties 
in keeping national states that are culturally and regionally segmented intact. 
They consequently take the form of a self-dissolution, of self-destruction – a 
kind of collective political demission or resignation. One example is the deci-
sion of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party on October 7, 1989, to dissolve 
itself (1,059 delegates to the party congress voted for dissolution, and only 159 
resisted it). Or consider the Czechoslovak communist regime’s relinquishing of 
power in the space of ten days during November 1989. The Soviet regime 
imploded quite suddenly and unexpectedly during the autumn months of 1991, 
even though dissipative tendencies had been evident for some time. Under the 
postcommunist Russian regime that followed, living standards dropped precipi-
tously, with roughly half of all economic activity taking place underground and 
outside state control or regulation. The Yugoslav regime imploded with nearly 
equal suddenness during 1990-91. The hecatomb of much of the Italian politi-
cal elite between 1991 and 1994 in a whirlpool of revelations about corrupt 
practices is another interesting case, although the regime itself never quite 
imploded. 
Weak political regimes in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa seem particu-
larly vulnerable to small-scale implosion crises. In this region, states are skelet-
al, in part because they are beset by vertical political cleavages between ethnic 
groups with regional bases, rather than by horizontal cleavages based on social 
class. Consequently, instead of revolutions there are successive small implo-
sions followed by the ascendancy of new but short-lived ruling cliques. Wheth-
er more sweeping implosions will occur in such multiethnic and territorially 
fragmented states as Indonesia, or in the somewhat culturally and regionally 
divided China, is a question of great importance. 
Do economic disasters constitute another distinct kind of crisis? Stephen 
Haggard and Robert Kaufman (1995) think so, and they are certainly not alone 
in this belief. They argue that a sharp deterioration in a country’s aggregate 
economic performance may challenge its political regime by adversely affect-
ing a wide segment of the population and by forcing ruling elites to adopt dra-
matically different policies. The new policies alienate the coalition of groups 
that benefited from the previous, failed policies and supported the elites. If the 
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new policies do not quickly reverse the economic deterioration, and if the rul-
ing elites are unable to fashion a new and powerful coalition to support those 
policies, the elites may be overthrown and the regime replaced. Like defeats in 
warfare, economic disasters may thus constitute crises in which elites are re-
configured and regimes are changed. In Germany during the Great Depression, 
economic collapse and mass unemployment, preceded by a catastrophic mone-
tary inflation during 1923-24, climaxed in the brutal political crisis and elite 
machinations that unfolded during December 1932 and January 1933, follow-
ing the Nazi Party’s strong performance in 1932 elections. Its outcome was the 
harsh Nazi dictatorship that followed Hitler’s ascendancy as chancellor at the 
end of January 1933, the Reichstag fire, which he used as a pretext for assum-
ing emergency powers less than four weeks later, and the rigged elections he 
engineered in early March 1933. Similarly in the Soviet Union, as Jack A. 
Goldstone discusses in chapter 5, ever more dire economic circumstances dur-
ing the 1980s lay behind Mikhail Gorbachev’s increasingly divisive efforts to 
reform the Soviet system. The result was a profound political crisis during 
August and September 1991 in which the Soviet regime was effectively de-
stroyed. 
It is clear, however, that not all economic disasters produce elite- and re-
gime-destroying crises. Anglo-American and Scandinavian elites and demo-
cratic regimes survived the Great Depression, Mexican elites and the PRI re-
gime weathered severe economic crises in 1982 and 1994-95 (discussed in 
chapter 4), and during 1992-93 elites and regimes in Venezuela and Peru were 
badly shaken but not destroyed by failed coups and constitutional confronta-
tions that were in great measure fueled by steep economic declines. It thus 
appears that only in some conditions – the central feature of which may be the 
presence of elites that are already deeply divided and therefore unable to im-
plement effective new policies – do economic disasters constitute highly de-
structive crises. 
Another, more indistinct kind of crisis involves sudden breakdowns of unst-
able democratic regimes. In Europe twenty-two new democracies emerged 
overnight from the cataclysm of World War I, and eight older democracies 
survived the war: those in Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Italy, the Neth-
erlands, Norway, and Sweden (Spain and Portugal might be added, though 
nascent democratic regimes in both countries soon fell in crises during the 
1920s). Born in war-induced crises and upheavals, only two of the twenty-two 
new democratic regimes (Finland and Ireland) were still functioning at the start 
of World War II in 1939. Among the older democracies, as already noted, Italy 
succumbed to a fascist regime when a chain of crises involving postwar insur-
rections and Mussolini’s 1922 “march on Rome” climaxed in the crisis trig-
gered by the Fascists’ murder of Socialist leader Giacomo Matteotti in June 
1924. By 1939, Europe was a cemetery of twenty-one collapsed democracies, 
each of them destroyed in a crisis during which nondemocratic forces seized 
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power. But admittedly, the crises in which sudden democratic breakdowns 
occur are highly variable in their forms and intensities, so that it is difficult to 
speak of a generic “democratic breakdown crisis.” 
A coup d’etat is often a central feature of such breakdown crises, and coups 
figure importantly in the other kinds of crises we have surveyed. We are reluc-
tant, however, to view coups as a distinguishing feature of crises. Most coups 
are limited to skirmishes over the control of a few strategic buildings. They 
reveal the weakness of states and are manifestations of fights and rivalries 
among political leaders and cliques. But most coups merely alter political peck-
ing orders in small ways (for example, the numerous and recurring coups by 
cliques of military officers in many African countries). Only where the state is 
strong may a coup result in a substantial replacement of elites and a change of 
regime. Coups led by the two Napoleons in France (1799 and 1852), by Col. 
Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt (1952), and by General Augusto Pinochet in 
Chile (1973) are good examples. They might constitute another kind of crisis or 
perhaps help to specify the heterogeneous “breakdown crisis” we have men-
tioned, but we see no obvious way to separate the relatively few consequential 
coups from the many inconsequential ones. 
It will be apparent that the kinds of crises we have canvassed often overlap 
and compound each other. To take a particularly elaborate example, defeat in 
warfare followed by an implosion crisis led to a revolutionary crisis in Russia 
in 1917. After disastrous military setbacks at German hands and mass troop 
desertions, strikes and demonstrations broke out in St. Petersburg on March 7, 
1917. One week later, Nicholas II abdicated, and a political implosion of the 
tsarist regime occurred. A month later, the run-up to a revolutionary crisis 
began with the arrival of Lenin, and that crisis climaxed with the Bolsheviks’ 
seizure of power on November 7, 1917. Similarly in Turkey during 1917, mili-
tary defeat of the Ottoman regime was followed by the regime’s implosion and 
by the emergence of a charismatic leader, Kamal Ataturk, who then reconsti-
tuted the state and initiated a modernizing process (Dogan, 1984). A compara-
ble sequence of military defeat, political implosion, and the emergence of a 
“providential” leader (Marshall Philippe Petain) unfolded in France in 1940. 
We do not mean to suggest that in a given country and time there is but one 
kind of crisis or that crises always and everywhere consist of a few brief and 
clear-cut events. Rather, we are focused primarily on crises as important phe-
nomena in the study of elites and the origins of regimes. Our rough inventory 
helps, we hope, to accomplish this aim. It is relevant to note that only one of 
the seven kinds of crises we have distinguished – the revolutionary crisis – 
appears among the four modes of transitions from authoritarian regimes that 
Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe Schmitter (1991) have outlined. Among their 
three other transition modes, elite “pacts” specifying a programmed alternation 
in power may or may not modify the basic character of a regime. Some pacts 
do indeed have this consequence, but as Burton and Higley argue in chapter 3, 
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many do not. The “imposition” mode Karl and Schmitter discern in the Soviet 
transition is, we believe, better viewed as a regime implosion. Similarly, whe-
reas Karl and Schmitter treat the Yugoslav regime’s disintegration as illustrat-
ing a fourth “reform” mode, events since they constructed their typology more 
clearly indicate an implosion. Finally, a series of cases they evaluate as “diffi-
cult to classify” are for us crises that arose from defeats in warfare: Japan and 
Germany-Austria in 1945, Greece and Portugal in 1974, Argentina in 1983. 
Other cases unclassified by Karl and Schmitter underwent elite and regime 
changes during crises that stemmed from the sudden withdrawal of foreign 
support: Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria in 1989. It 
is necessary, moreover, to consider all kinds of crises and regime changes, not 
just exits from authoritarian rule. Crisis-generated replacements of authorita-
rian regimes by other dictatorships and breakdowns of democratic regimes 
must also be studied. 
Crises and Elite Change 
“Elite” is a word that is used almost as casually and routinely as “crisis.” In 
some sociological studies, however, “elite” is given a more precise meaning by 
estimating the size of a social system’s top level. One example is tsarist Russia 
at the end of the eighteenth century, in which the individuals who monopolized 
ruling functions have been estimated to number nine thousand men (LeDonne, 
1993, 288). Obviously, there are difficult questions about the definition and 
criteria of “eliteness.” In 1947, the Hungarian communist government deported 
some ten thousand “capitalists” from Budapest and other large cities to rural 
villages. In 1941, Stalin’s secret police agents decapitated the Polish army, 
executing some fifteen thousand officers at Kalinin, the Katyn Forest, and 
Starobel’sk. Certainly, all of those Hungarian businessmen and Polish officers 
were not “rulers,” though many analysts and observers would see them as part 
of their country’s “elites.” The French “political class” has been estimated at 
three thousand persons in 1990, even though various Who’s Who? compilations 
numbered France’s “visible elites” at approximately twenty thousand persons 
(Dogan, 1994). 
The size of political elites or of a strictly defined political class depends on a 
country’s size. For countries the size of Germany, it is plausible to think in 
terms of a few thousand persons who head the major institutions, organizations, 
and political movements and who are able to take, force, or impede political 
decisions on a regular basis (Hoffmann-Lange, 1992). For countries the size of 
the United States, the most plausible number is closer to ten thousand persons 
(Dye, 1983). Located in an array of hierarchies and sectors, political elites 
usually display widely varying interests and stances, including antiregime 
stances in many countries. There are, of course, tens or hundreds of thousands 
of people in a modern society who resemble elites in levels of education, 
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wealth, and other social characteristics and whose second-echelon positions in 
powerful institutions, organizations, and movements enable them also to influ-
ence political decisions. But the political influence of these persons is usually 
intermittent, indirect, and limited to specific issues pertaining to the organiza-
tions and movements in which they are located. They are better thought of as 
“shadow elites” or what Gaetano Mosca (1939) calls the “second stratum.” By 
political elites we refer only to holders of strategic positions in powerful organ-
izations and movements, including dissident ones, who are able to affect na-
tional political outcomes regularly and significantly. 
Political elites are the critical actors in crises. Indeed, many crises are in-
itiated by the actions or inactions of leaders and tiny groups at the top of the 
political pyramid. Political fights among elites occur precisely because it is 
unclear who will win them, and their outcomes are seen to depend upon the 
actions that various leaders and elite groups may or may not take. We contend 
that, especially in crises, the “makers of history” enjoy a latitude of action. We 
adduce as evidence the innumerable memoirs and testimonies of political lead-
ers recalling the crises they faced, the hopes, doubts, and fears they harbored, 
and the choices they made on the basis of assumptions they knew were frail. 
The search by historians for causes, determinisms, and “necessary” outcomes 
of crises comes later, when the dust has settled. If, by some magic, historians 
could do their job in advance of crises, then crises would not occur because the 
potential losers would adopt a different strategy. In working such magic, how-
ever, historians would do away with most of political history. 
There are few political crises that do not alter the composition and function-
ing of elites in important ways. Crises and elite change are closely related. 
Getting a better grip on the genetic importance of crises, therefore, requires 
comprehending the kinds of elite changes they may induce. This is the province 
of elite theory, the seminal contributions to which were made by Mosca, Vil-
fredo Pareto, and, to a lesser extent, Robert Michels early in the twentieth cen-
tury, even though all three elite theorists too often neglected the role of crises 
in propelling elite change. 
Elite Composition 
Crises most often affect the composition of political officeholders (e.g., cabinet 
ministers, party leaders, and parliamentarians). Changes in the makeup of bu-
reaucratic, economic, and other elites who stand at some distance from the 
corridors of government power are usually less pronounced, though crises also 
frequently produce important changes in the composition of military elites. 
Japan in 1945 is an excellent example, and it is the subject of detailed analysis 
by Hiromitsu Kataoka in chapter 9. According to the Potsdam Declaration of 
August 2, 1945, only persons who had not been associated with the defeated 
Imperial regime could hold high political office in postwar Japan. In an early 
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study, Hans Baerwald (1959) found that some 210,000 Japanese notables who 
survived the war were purged by the American occupation authorities. Kataoka 
confirms Baerwald’s estimate for notables, though he adds on the basis of more 
recent research, that altogether some 640,000 persons were purged from Japa-
nese public life during the years after 1945. Four of every five of those purged 
were military officers; but 16.5 percent were former political leaders and activ-
ists. However, the upper reaches of the formidable Japanese government bu-
reaucracy were left virtually intact. Out of a total bureaucratic elite “talent 
pool” numbering 8,300 officials, fewer than one percent were purged. Like-
wise, the largest part of the business elite escaped the purge. As General Doug-
las MacArthur explained, some of the most able business leaders were removed 
because they were “born and bred as feudalistic overlords who held the lives 
and destiny of the majority of Japan’s people in virtual slavery and geared the 
country with both the tools and the will to wage aggressive war” (quoted in 
Baerwald, 1959, 93). Nevertheless, Baerwald found that only 468 of a total of 
2,395 private enterprise owners and managers were removed, while Kataoka, in 
chapter 9, calculates that fewer than one percent of the top business elite were 
purged. Baerwald concludes that  
on the basis of statistical evidence it is fallacious to believe that the purge sub-
stantially altered the composition of Japan’s leadership in these [bureaucratic 
and business] fields of endeavor; the purge was, at best, only temporarily and 
partially effective in changing the economic leadership of Japan (93). 
In Germany, too, most business and bureaucratic elites survived the Nazi take-
over in 1933, and they also survived the Nazi regime’s total defeat in 1945, as 
Ursula Hoffmann-Lange recounts in chapter 8. Although its members collabo-
rated actively with Hitler’s government, the business elite remained intact, and 
it largely retained its autonomy during the Third Reich. With only a few excep-
tions, the business elite was similarly unaffected by the Nazi regime’s destruc-
tion. As Hoffmann-Lange (chapter 8) and also Herve Joly (1995) show, busi-
ness leaders moved from the Nazi regime to the Federal Republic regime 
during and after 1945 without difficulties. Most high-level German bureaucrats 
also survived the Nazi regime’s destruction, even though the occupying author-
ities gave priority to recruiting and promoting new bureaucrats untainted by 
Nazi associations. Studying the demise and replacement of the Ottoman and 
Chinese imperial regimes early in the twentieth century, Fred Riggs (1994) has 
found an altogether similar continuity of administrative and business elites, 
despite the Turkish and Chinese regime changes. 
Six possible effects of crises on political elite composition can be distin-
guished: 
- Some elite persons and groups remain untouched and retain their positions, 
with each case being of special interest, 
- Some are obliged to accept less powerful and prestigious but still politically 
influential positions, 
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- Some are pushed out of politically influential positions and forced to take up 
more nonpolitical and specialized positions, 
- Some are obliged to accept obscure positions (e.g., an ambassadorship in a 
peripheral country) or other cushioned sinecures, 
- Some manage to undergo “ideological conversions” at early points so that 
they survive politically in the postcrisis regime, 
- Some incumbents of elite positions, as well as some positions themselves, 
are simply eliminated, although the sectoral proportions vary and must be 
investigated in each case. This is the most significant effect of crises on elite 
composition, but it is also the most difficult to measure and evaluate. 
The extent of such changes in the composition of political elites differs among 
the several levels of a political hierarchy: at the apex or nucleus of the political 
system, at immediately adjacent echelons, or at middle ranks. The amount of 
change also differs between a nation’s capital and its regional and local centers. 
The extent of elite replacement depends, additionally, upon similarities and 
differences between the old and the new regime: if both are authoritarian or 
both are democratic – what Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) call “within-
type” regime transitions – the replacement is likely to be less substantial than in 
“out-of-type” transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes or vice 
versa. 
Most crises, in any event, engender a change of guard at the elite level, al-
though the new guard does not necessarily appear overnight. New elites often 
emerge piecemeal, coming from “shadow elites,” from prisons, from exile, and 
from underground organizations. These new elites are seldom able to take 
charge of a crisis in its early stages. However, by the time a new regime is 
instituted, there is a significantly altered set of elite groups, at least some of 
which have had little or no previous experience in top-level power positions. 
Elite Relations and Behavior 
In order to assess changes in elite functioning that occur as a consequence of 
crises, we suggest distinguishing between political elites that are fundamentally 
disunited and those that are “consensually” or “ideocratically” united. Dis-
united elites are marked by pervasive distrust and fear. The groups making 
them up adhere to differing codes of political conduct, view politics in winner-
take-all terms, dispute the worth of political institutions, and engage in unre-
strained, often violent struggles for government power. Where a political elite 
is disunited, an irregular seizure of executive offices through a coup or elite-led 
uprising is probable during a crisis. Its result is usually an authoritarian regime 
operated by the group or groups that carry out the power seizure. Although 
crises and the elite struggles they involve may sometimes open the way to more 
democratic regimes, a new democratic order is likely to be short-lived unless 
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elites have somehow managed to become more united during the crisis that 
produces that order. 
There are, however, two distinct configurations of united political elites. In 
one, all or nearly all groups belong to a dominant party or movement, and they 
uniformly profess its ideology, religious belief, or ethnonationalist creed – an 
“ideocratic” configuration that is primarily coerced (Piekalkiewicz and Penn, 
1995). Such an “ideocratically united” political elite usually originates in a 
revolutionary crisis during which an extremist group gains the upper hand, 
destroys most of its rivals, and dictates that henceforth anyone who possesses 
or aspires to power must conform to the extremist group’s doctrine and organi-
zational base: examples include the Russian Bolsheviks from 1921, Yugosla-
via’s League of Communists from 1945, Mao’s communists in China from 
1949, Castro’s communists in Cuba from 1961, and the Shia fundamentalists in 
Iran from 1980. An ideocratically united political elite may also be created 
when a foreign power imposes an extremist group on a country following con-
quest in warfare, as occurred in East Central Europe after World War II and in 
South Vietnam in 1975. Because of their exceptional capacity to identify and 
weed out “troublemakers,” regimes created by ideocratically united elites tend 
to be long-lived. 
In the other configuration of united elites, groups are affiliated with compet-
ing parties, movements, and beliefs, but they share a consensus about rules and 
codes of restrained political competitions. Such “consensually united” political 
elites have sometimes originated in fundamental compromises and accommo-
dations negotiated by leaders of waning elite camps. As Burton and Higley 
discuss in chapter 3, such sudden and deliberate “elite settlements” appear to 
occur only during profound crises that threaten elite bloodletting but at the 
same time provide key leaders with strong incentives and sufficient autonomy 
to “settle” the most basic disputes between their respective camps. The much-
analyzed Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 in England was the classic instance 
of an elite settlement (see chapter 3 and, inter aha, Mansfield, 1964; Rustow, 
1970; Weingast, 1997). Consensually united political elites have also origi-
nated through political cooperation in operating “home-rule” governments in 
colonial territories and through unifying elite struggles for national indepen-
dence (e.g., American, Australian, Canadian, Indian, and New Zealand elites 
under and then against British rule; Norwegian elites under and then against 
Swedish rule during the nineteenth century; Senegalese elites under and then 
against French rule before and after World War II). Once political elites be-
come consensually united, their competitions for electoral and other support are 
restrained and conducive to the peaceful, politically binding elections that are 
the hallmark of stable democracies, or at least of liberal oligarchic regimes like 
those in the English-speaking and Scandinavian countries before universal 
male suffrage was introduced. 
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These distinctions between disunited and two types of united elites are, of 
course, simplifications. In reality, political elites in all countries compete conti-
nually for advantage, and none is ever fully united. Similarly, most political 
elite groups have nothing to gain in a war of all against all, so probably no 
political elite is ever completely disunited. Elite professions of ideocratic un-
animity always conceal doctrinal disputes and much jockeying for power; a 
voluntary elite consensus about the rules and proprieties of restrained competi-
tions is always fraying and in need of reinforcement; disunited elite expressions 
of unbridgeable oppositions are often belied by secret deals. The extent to 
which political elites are disunited or united thus fluctuates with changing 
circumstances, and the ambiguities and secretiveness of elite behavior make its 
assessment difficult. Nevertheless, we believe that shifts from one to another of 
these basic patterns of elite functioning can be observed in a significant number 
of countries, and we contend that these shifts usually occur during or imme-
diately following political crises. 
Studying the relation between crises and regime changes must therefore in-
volve assessments not only of the changing compositions of political elites but 
also of changes in their disunited or united functioning. In revolutionary crises, 
wholesale change in both the composition and functioning of elites is likely. In 
other kinds of crises, there may be significant change in one but not the other 
aspect. In crisis-induced settlements, for example, there is usually little change 
in elite composition but a fundamental change in elite functioning. In most 
crisis-induced overthrows of authoritarian rulers, conversely, there is usually 
significant change in elite composition but no basic change in elite functioning; 
the authoritarian rulers are replaced by a congeries of cliques and factions that 
continue the disunited pattern that sparked or contributed to the crisis in the 
first place. In chapter 8, Hoffmann-Lange discusses how the disunited pattern 
continued in Germany down to the Nazi regime’s onset; in chapter 9, Kataoka 
traces the same pattern among Japanese elites from the Meiji Restoration of 
1868 until the end of World War II. 
Crises and Regime Change 
A political regime is the basic pattern by which government decisionmaking 
power is organized, exercised, and transferred in a society. We may speak, for 
example, of monarchical or republican, parliamentary or presidential, and au-
thoritarian or totalitarian regimes (Linz, 1975). A regime is not necessarily 
synonymous with the current wielders of government power – a “Chirac re-
gime” in France or a “Clinton regime” in America at the time of this writing. 
Chief executives such as Jacques Chirac and Bill Clinton and the governments 
(or “administrations,” in the more accurate American term) they lead come and 
go according to electoral fortunes, scandals, party splits, and much else; but the 
basic pattern of organizing, exercising, and transferring government power 
 285 
among its successive holders may nevertheless persist, and in some countries it 
has done so over long periods. Thus, in Britain there have been many Tory, 
Whig, Liberal, Labour, and assorted coalition governments since the Glorious 
Revolution; but government executive power has been continuously organized, 
exercised, and transferred in accordance with the principles and processes of a 
sovereign, popularly and periodically elected parliament that were agreed by 
contending elites in that seminal crisis. Britain has, in effect, had but one slow-
ly evolving political regime during the past three hundred years. In France 
since 1789, by contrast, the organization, exercise, and transfer of government 
power has oscillated between five republican, three monarchical, and two “im-
perial” regimes, plus an authoritarian one (the Vichy regime during World War 
II), each of which was born in a major crisis. 
Comparativists have constructed many typologies of regimes, but we are 
content to use the most familiar and basic one: traditional (monarchical), autho-
ritarian, totalitarian, and democratic regimes. Each type can be unstable or 
stable according to the occurrence or nonoccurrence or the perceived likelihood 
or unlikelihood of irregular seizures of government power through coups and 
uprisings. The composition and functioning of political elites is, we contend, 
the most important determinant of the type of regime that exists in a country. 
There are, of course, other determinants of regimes, but none is as critical as 
the configuration of elites. Where elite composition changes only gradually and 
where elite groups are consensually united, stable democratic regimes evolve 
and persist over long periods (e.g., the Anglo-American and Scandinavian 
democracies); where elite composition changes even more slowly but where 
elite groups are ideocratically united, relatively stable totalitarian regimes pers-
ist and perhaps evolve toward a post-totalitarian condition (e.g., the Soviet 
Union from 1922 until 1991, or the Chinese communist regime from 1949 to 
the present; for a discussion of the posttotalitarian condition, see Linz and 
Stepan, 1996). On the other hand, where there are sizable changes in elite com-
position during crises and where elite groups remain disunited, a succession of 
unstable authoritarian regimes, perhaps interrupted by unstable and short-lived 
democratic regimes, is the usual pattern (e.g., all Latin American countries 
during the nineteenth century and most African countries during the past forty 
years). 
Between these stable democratic, stable totalitarian, and unstable authorita-
rian poles, however, there are several complex patterns and possibilities. At 
least eleven “itineraries” of regime change that are associated with crises and 
with the changed elite compositions and patterns of elite functioning that crises 
produce can be identified (see table 1.1). 
These itineraries do not exhaust the modern record of regime changes, and 
our classification of some of the typical cases can be disputed. Our purpose is 
to highlight the importance and variability of crisis-induced elite changes in the 
origins of regimes. The itineraries listed involve different patterns of elite re-
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placement and elite functioning, but several complications need to be men-
tioned. As regards elite replacement, one complication is hierarchical level: the 
higher the level, the greater the extent of replacement. In many regime changes, 
as noted earlier, the entire group of uppermost political rulers is replaced, while 
the turnover of political elites at middle levels is more limited. A second com-
plication, also commented on earlier, is sector: elite replacement is almost 
always greater among top-level political leaders than among other powerful 
elite groups such as high-level bureaucrats, business leaders, or prominent 
clergy. A third complication is geographic: elite replacement is usually greater 
in the political capital of a country than in its provincial cities and towns. A 
fourth complication is simply the size of the political elite: the smaller and 
more concentrated the top of the political hierarchy, compared with middle and 
lower levels, the greater the rate of the top elite’s replacement. Still another 
complication is time: if a regime has been long-lived, an entire generation of 
previous political leaders will have died by the time a regime change occurs, 
and there will accordingly be that many fewer experienced leaders available for 
top positions; conversely, if a regime is short-lived, leaders of one or more 
earlier regimes may reappear rapidly to construct a new regime. 
In studying the relation between elite change and regime change, it is also 
necessary to take into account “conversions” or adaptations by political leaders 
and elites. Elite replacement may be limited because many persons and groups 
suddenly convert to a new regime and its principles. A famous example was the 
chief rabbi of Toledo who became Catholic bishop of that city when Queen 
Isabel ascended to the Spanish throne in 1474. Such conversions may occur at 
all levels of a political hierarchy, and through them elites may retain their posi-
tions or obtain comparable ones. The existence of political chameleons is well 
known in French history, and the world has recently witnessed more or less 
wholesale conversions to liberal democratic principles among the former com-
munist elites of Eastern Europe. 
Finally, a change of political elites is possible only if there is an organized 
opposition and thus a reservoir of counterelites. A new ruling elite cannot be 
created ex nihilo. When their communist regimes fell between 1989 and 1991, 
the countries of Eastern Europe were not pluralist societies. Apart from Poland, 
where the communist regime had always been more authoritarian than totalita-
rian (Higley and Pakulski, 1995; Linz and Stepan, 1996), there were no free 
parties, no free trade unions, and no economic forces independent of the state, 
and in the Orthodox countries of the region there were no relatively indepen-
dent church hierarchies. Because of the absence of counterelite power bases 
under communist rule, it is not surprising that large proportions of postcom-
munist elites have consisted of persons who were prominent in the communist 
regimes. 
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Table 1.1: Itineraries of Regime Change and  
Associated Patterns of Elite Change 
Regime Itinerary Elite Composition/Functioning Typical Cases 
Traditional  
to stable democratic 
From notables to professional 
politicians, progressively chosen in 
free elections/Consensual 
unification of elites 
England, 1688-69; 
Sweden, 1808-9; 
Netherlands, 1813-14 
Traditional  
to authoritarian 
Annihilation of ruling class/ 
New elites are disunited 
Turkey, 1922; Egypt, 
1952; Ethiopia, 1974 
Traditional to totalitarian 
Annihilation of ruling class/New, 
ideocratically united elite takes over 
Russia, 1917-22; 
Yugoslavia, 1945;  
Iran, 1979-81 
Unstable democratic 
to stable democratic 
Hecatomb of a political 
class/Consensually united elite 
begins to form 
France, 1958-62;  
Italy, 1992-94 
Unstable democratic 
to authoritarian 
Replacement of politicians by 
military and bureaucratic elites/ 
Elites disunited 
Portugal, 1926; Spain, 
1936-39; most East 
European countries,  
1919-39 
Unstable democratic  
to totalitarian 
Persistence of bureaucratic and 
business elites/New, ideocratically 
united political elite represses 
opposition elites 
Italy, 1922-26;  
Germany, 1933 
Authoritarian to new 
authoritarian 
Opposition elites annihilated/Ruling 
elites remain disunited 
Indonesia, 1965 
Authoritarian to  
stable democratic 
Authoritarian ruler toppled/ 
Consensual unification of remaining 
elites 
Costa Rica, 1948; 
Colombia, 1957-58; 
Venezuela, 1957-58 
Authoritarian to  
totalitarian 
Annihilation of ruling elites/New, 
ideocratically united elite takes over 
Most East European 
countries, 1945-48 
Totalitarian to  
posttotalitarian 
Rise of technocratic elites/ 
Ideocratically united ruling elite 
begins to fragment 
Hungary, 1970s-80s; 
U.S.S.R., 1970s-90s; 
China 1990s 
Posttotalitarian to stable  
or unstable democratic 
Ruling ideocratically united elite 
implodes/Consensual fusion or 
fragmentation of surviving elites 
Hungary, 1989;  
U.S.S.R.-Russia, 1991 
Crises, Elites, Regimes: Questions about Causation 
We have argued that political crises are pivotal events that frequently produce 
changes in elites and regimes. The historical and contemporary political record 
on this point is indisputable. Put in the form of a simple causal model, 
 
political crisis →  elite change →  regime change 
 
As we have seen, however, the relation between crises, elites, and regimes is 
not so straightforward. When it is “unpacked,” as we have begun to do in this 
chapter and as Alan Knight does in the next chapter, the causal arrows quickly 
start to point in both directions. Crises effect changes in elites and regimes, to 
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be sure, but elites and regimes often create crises. Many crises involve, but they 
also derive from, elite confrontations and regime weaknesses. The danger of 
tautology is evident: elites and regimes change during crises that elites and 
regimes create. 
One way to reduce the circularity is to look for conditions in which the pre-
ponderant flow of causation is from crises to elites and regimes and for other 
conditions in which the preponderant flow is in the reverse direction, from 
elites and regimes to crises. Crises created mainly by exogenous forces – con-
quests by foreign powers, fluctuations in world markets that create local eco-
nomic disasters, as well as calamitous earthquakes, fires, and floods – may 
independently cause changes in elites and in the regimes elites operate. Similar-
ly, crises that originate in dramatically altered situations of mass populations – 
the onset of famines, diseases, and population explosions or sudden mass mi-
grations into territories – occur more or less independent of existing elites and 
regimes, yet they may serve as catalysts of elite and regime change. 
We are interested, however, in more overtly political crises: the achievement 
of national independence, defeat in warfare, a revolutionary outbreak, a mainly 
endogenous economic disaster, an implosion of elite and regime power bases, a 
democratic breakdown. As Knight worries in chapter 2, most political crises 
have important origins in elites and regimes themselves, and their analysis is 
indeed uncomfortably tautological. At the same time, Knight contends, most 
political crises have important mass or “structural” causes. To this extent, it is 
not crises themselves that explain elite and regime change but, rather, the mass 
and structural conditions that fuel crises in which elite and regime changes then 
take place. In Knight’s view, our claim that political regimes originate in crises 
and elite confrontations is at best only half the story, and at worst it ignores the 
most important causes of political change, which are the conditions and forces 
that shape mass discontents and propel mass actions. Moreover, Knight argues, 
there are reciprocal relations between elites and mass publics, so that elites 
compete for the support of mass publics, which the latter are always capable of 
withdrawing, and there are also reciprocal relations between regimes and mass 
publics, so that regime strength or weakness shapes the probability and success 
or failure of antiregime mass mobilizations. 
Somewhat contrary to Knight, we regard the idea that mass publics may re-
volt or otherwise force a regime change without emerging or existing political 
elites mobilizing and leading them to be as misleading as the notion, before 
Pasteur discovered microbes, that “agents” of diseases are generated sponta-
neously. We do not ignore the occurrence of sudden, essentially “eliteless” 
peasant jacqueries, worker riots, or student demonstrations. These take place 
sporadically in nearly all known societies and historical periods. In a discussion 
of mass uprisings in Mexico – especially the self-proclaimed “Zapatista” upris-
ing that occurred in the state of Chiapas on January 1, 1994 – Knight, in chap-
ter 4, highlights the importance of such events. But more or less spontaneous 
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manifestations of mass discontent (the Kwangju uprising in South Korea in 
1980, the Tiananmen Square protests in Beijing during May and June 1989) do 
not by themselves topple regimes. One reason is that they are almost always 
too local and short-lived to have such a momentous effect. For masses to bring 
down regimes, especially modern regimes with all the firepower they deploy, 
serious organization and the articulation of a clear leadership or elite that can 
plan and direct a mass assault on the bastions of power is essential. 
Our skepticism about the importance and independence of mass publics in 
producing crises and the elite and regime changes they entail is not widely 
shared among comparativists. Knight takes direct issue with us in the next 
chapter, and he argues cogently for the proposition that, especially during cris-
es, mass publics play decisive roles. Is it in times of crisis that elite autonomy 
wavers and contracts, as he suggests, or is it precisely at moments of traumatic 
events that the freedom of political leaders and elites to make decisions, wisely 
or foolishly, is greatest? Burton and Higley argue in chapter 3 that in the kinds 
of crises that produce elite settlements, elites are very much in control; indeed, 
settlements are possible only where this is so. Hennie Kotze’s detailed account 
in chapter 10 of how elites maneuvered and largely controlled the crisis in 
which South Africa’s regime was trans-formed during the early 1990s supports 
and further illustrates Burton and Higley’s argument. Assessing the Soviet 
Union’s collapse in 1991 as stemming from a true revolutionary crisis, Jack A. 
Goldstone similarly concludes, in chapter 5, that the crisis unfolded primarily 
from the top down – from changes in elites – rather than from the bottom up. 
Indeed, much of the recent writing about the Soviet regime’s dramatic implo-
sion highlights the absence of mass actions (e.g., Fish, 1995; Hough, 1997; 
Kotz, 1997). 
The competing views of elite or mass causation fit different historical cir-
cumstances. Neither is universally valid, and each can be supported with nu-
merous examples. But precisely because of this, naive theories that pretend to 
universal validity fail. In March 1917 in St. Petersburg, thousands of civilians 
and soldiers played the decisive role. But during the forty-eight hours between 
the assassination of Caesar and the meeting of the Roman Senate, only a hand-
ful of individuals played the crucial, and exclusive, role. If forced to choose 
between the competing views, we believe that the weight of historical evidence 
is that leaders and elites are the substantially autonomous and thus decisive 
actors in crisis situations. 
The following chapters explore how patterns of crises have affected political 
elites and regimes in a score of countries. All the authors are less interested in 
why these crises occurred – questions of complex causation and historical 
contingency that require full-fledged historical studies – than in their conse-
quences for elites and political regimes. We suggest that three propositions 
emerge: 
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- The crises studied greatly challenged existing regimes and the political elites 
that operated them, so that substantial elite and regime change was unavoid-
able. 
- The character of successor regimes was a product of the choices that leaders 
and elites made during the crises, and those choices are best understood in 
terms of the changed composition and functioning of elites. 
- The crises were profound enough to ensure that there could be no going 
back, that is, that the new elite configurations and regimes were likely to 
persist, absent another deep crisis. 
In sum, the crises and elite and regime changes dealt with in this volume were 
watershed events in the politics of the countries where they occurred. They 
demand a central place, despite their contingent and impetuous character, in 
explanations of political change. 
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